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The neural processing of moral sensitivity to issues of justice and care.
Abstract
The empirical and theoretical consideration of ethical decision making has focused on the process of
moral judgment; however, a precondition to judgment is moral sensitivity, the ability to detect and evaluate
moral issues [Rest, J. R. (1984). The major components of morality. In W. Kurtines & J. Gewirtz (Eds.),
Morality, moral behaviour, and moral development (pp. 24–38). New York, NY: Wiley]. Using functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and contextually standardized, real life moral issues, we demonstrate
that sensitivity to moral issues is associated with activation of the polar medial prefrontal cortex, dorsal
posterior cingulate cortex, and posterior superior temporal sulcus (STS). These activations suggest that
moral sensitivity is related to access to knowledge unique to one's self, supported by autobiographical
memory retrieval and social perspective taking. We also assessed whether sensitivity to rule-based or
“justice” moral issues versus social situational or “care” moral issues is associated with dissociable
neural processing events. Sensitivity to justice issues was associated with greater activation of the left
intraparietal sulcus, whereas sensitivity to care issues was associated with greater activation of the
ventral posterior cingulate cortex, ventromedial and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and thalamus. These
results suggest a role for access to self histories and identities and social perspectives in sensitivity to
moral issues, provide neural representations of the subcomponent process of moral sensitivity originally
proposed by Rest, and support differing neural information processing for the interpretive recognition of
justice and care moral issues.
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Abstract
The empirical and theoretical consideration of ethical decision making has focused on the
process of moral judgment; however, a precondition to judgment is moral sensitivity, the
ability to detect and evaluate moral issues [Rest, J. R. (1984). The major components of
morality. In W. Kurtines & J. Gewirtz (Eds.), Morality, moral behaviour, and moral
development (pp. 24–38). New York, NY: Wiley]. Using functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) and contextually standardized, real life moral issues, we demonstrate that
sensitivity to moral issues is associated with activation of the polar medial prefrontal
cortex, dorsal posterior cingulate cortex, and posterior superior temporal sulcus (STS).
These activations suggest that moral sensitivity is related to access to knowledge unique
to one's self, supported by autobiographical memory retrieval and social perspective
taking. We also assessed whether sensitivity to rule-based or “justice” moral issues
versus social situational or “care” moral issues is associated with dissociable neural
processing events. Sensitivity to justice issues was associated with greater activation of
the left intraparietal sulcus, whereas sensitivity to care issues was associated with greater

activation of the ventral posterior cingulate cortex, ventromedial and dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex, and thalamus. These results suggest a role for access to self histories
and identities and social perspectives in sensitivity to moral issues, provide neural
representations of the subcomponent process of moral sensitivity originally proposed by
Rest, and support differing neural information processing for the interpretive recognition
of justice and care moral issues.
Keywords: Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI); Moral sensitivity; Justice;
Care; Self-reference
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1. Introduction
Ethics refers to the body of moral values and principles held by an individual or group.
The ability to engage in ethical decision making is central to human social behavior and
encompasses the detection and interpretation of moral issues, as well as the ability to
reason and act based on moral principles. The determinants and underlying processes of
moral thought and action have long been the subject of theorizing and debate. Early
emphasis was placed on a cognitive-developmental model based on stages of moral
reasoning ability that emphasized moral reasoning as a conscious, deliberative process
(Kohlberg, 1958, Kohlberg, 1984, Piaget, 1932 and Piaget, 1965). Later, neoKohlbergian theorists advanced theories emphasizing a context-dependent process

involving components of moral decision making in addition to reasoning (Greene &
Haidt, 2002; Haidt, 2001 and Rest, 1994). These theorists proposed that moral conflicts
engage the automatic, implicit recruitment of cognitive structures, such as the activation
of social schemas or tacit knowledge (Narvaez & Bock, 2002), that allow the detection
and interpretation of a moral issue or situation (Rest, 1994). These processes may occur
below the level of conscious awareness (Narvaez & Bock, 2002; Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau,
& Thoma, 1999), and are generally analogous to the processes of moral sensitivity and
moral intuition, which have been described by Rest (1994) and Haidt (2001),
respectively. In particular, moral sensitivity refers to the detection and interpretation of a
moral issue or situation, including awareness of how different individuals may be
affected by an action taken in response to the issue (Rest, 1994). This interpretative
awareness is the first component of ethical decision making in that it gives rise to the
need to make a moral judgment, select a moral action, and other component processes of
moral behavior. Understanding the process of moral sensitivity is important, given its
theoretical distinction from deliberative moral reasoning (Brabeck & Rogers, 2000), its
potential for improvement by training and education (Bebeau, 2002), since individuals
vary dramatically in their ability to detect moral issues (Rest, 1984), and because moral
failure can result from a lack of moral sensitivity (Narvaez & Rest, 1995).
Additional advances in moral theory emphasized the distinction between moralities of
justice and care. Justice issues and ethics apply to moral conflicts that are solved by
universal ethical principles in the form of rules, rights, obligations and codes in the
pursuit of fairness and impartiality. Justice issues rest on an ideal of reciprocity and equal
respect and an injunction not to treat others unfairly. In the workplace, examples of
justice dilemma issues are common (e.g., turning down a request to falsify information
for a report; admitting responsibility for an error being blamed on someone else;
declining a friend's offer to provide classified, insider information). Care issues and
ethics apply to moral conflicts solved by a focus on the situational variable needs and
relationships of the people involved and guided by social emotions such as empathy and
altruism (Gilligan, 1982). Care issues rest on an ideal of attention and response to
individuals’ needs and an injunction not to turn away from someone in need (Gilligan &
Attanucci, 1988). In the workplace, examples of care dilemmas also are common (e.g.,
setting limits on work hours in order to spend time with one's children; visiting the gym
instead of working late; mentoring a difficult employee). Nevertheless, different
professions are differentially associated with justice (e.g., police) and care (e.g., nursing)
modes of moral thinking. Sex differences in justice and care thinking have been proposed
by Gilligan (1982), who contended that justice and care moral orientations, due to their
consideration of different facts, perspectives, and experiences, drive decision making
behaviors by relying on distinct cognitive processes. The research has, however, been
only partially supportive of such sex differences. On the one hand, women tend to have
an elective affinity for the voice of care and men for the voice of justice. On the other
hand, both men and women are able to and do use both ethical voices with equal levels of
dexterity and complexity—that is, they are not significantly different.
Defining the neural information processing related to moral thought may inform these
theories and their debate and provide useful inferences as to the bases of immoral actions.

The relationship between brain states and states of moral thought and behavior has been
informed by neurological case studies. Such studies, perhaps most famously represented
by that of Phineas Gage in the 19th century (Damasio, Grabowski, Frank, Galaburda, &
Damasio, 1994), indicate that moral thought and behavior are mediated, in large part, by
the prefrontal cortex in that damage to this area results in impaired social and moral
judgment (Anderson, Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1999). Recent in vivo
functional neuroimaging studies have provided an elaborated model of the neural
representations of moral cognitions, implicating a distributed cortical network involving
diverse frontal and posterior cortical areas including the anterior medial prefrontal and
orbital frontal (OFC) cortex, posterior cingulate cortex, anterior temporal lobes, posterior
superior temporal sulcus (STS), and limbic regions (e.g., amygdala) (Greene,
Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Moll et al., 2002; see Moll, Zahn, de
Oliveira-Souza, Krueger, & Grafman, 2005 for an excellent review).
In the present functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, we sought to isolate
the neural correlates of one specific component of moral thought, the ability to recognize
and interpret moral issues (i.e., moral sensitivity), and to compare the neural processing
related to moral sensitivity to two different types of moral content represented by issues
of justice and care. We hypothesized that the social and personal implications related to
the interpretive detection of moral issues are associated with distinct neural information
processing events when compared to the same task for nonmoral problems encountered in
everyday decisions. To test this possibility, we developed narratives that depicted issues
(both moral and nonmoral) encountered by a hypothetical individual in a typical work
setting. These narratives were designed to adhere to the principles of modern moral
theory and its instruments and to enhance ecological validity by presenting contexts and
issues highly familiar to our sample of research volunteers. We also hypothesized that
their relatedness to differing facts, suppositions and perspectives would result in
dissociable neural correlates of moral sensitivity to justice versus care issues. Thus, we
tested a topology of moral cognition that included the isolation of moral sensitivity and
the distinction between the ethics of justice and care. At the neural processing level, we
hypothesized that moral sensitivity would be associated with orbitofrontal cortex and
perhaps amygdala activations related to social cognitions, and that care and justice issues
would differ in this regard.

2. Materials and methods
2.1. Subjects
The participants were 16 right-handed men (35 ± 5.1 years of age, range 27–42)
(means ± 1 S.D.) enrolled in the Executive Masters in Business Administration (EMBA)
degree program at the Goizueta Business School of Emory University. Subjects had an
average duration of occupation in business settings of 13.5 ± 4.8 years prior to
matriculation into the program.
Subjects had no personal history of psychiatric or neurologic disorders by self-report and
were financially compensated for their participation. Subjects were pre-tested for reading

speed using the Sight Word Efficiency subtest of the Test of Word Reading Efficiency
(Torgesen et al., 1999). The mean estimated standard score for the subject pool was
94.3 ± 7.1, indicating average sight word efficiency for the group. The study was
conducted in the Biomedical Imaging Technology Center at Emory Hospital. Following
thorough discussion of the intent and risks associated with the study, subjects gave
written informed consent to participate in a study protocol approved by the Institutional
Review Board of Emory University.
2.2. Stimuli and tasks
We sought to adhere to a test of major elements of modern moral theory and therefore
incorporated into the task stimuli features common to instruments used in this field. Our
choice of stimuli was driven by five key considerations, each of which we discuss further
below. The stimuli needed to meet the following criteria: (i) be constructed by experts in
the field of ethics and moral reasoning, (ii) be ecologically valid for our sample, (iii)
provide contrast between moral and nonmoral issues, (iv) provide contrast between the
moral issues of justice and care, and (v) satisfy criteria for content validity.
The base context of the stimuli was a revised version of the business case scenario
developed by marketing ethicists Sparks and Hunt (1998) in their study of ethical
sensitivity. The characteristics of the Sparks and Hunt case scenario of greatest import to
the design of the present study are that (i) the scenario develops both ethical and
nonethical issues, and (ii) the issues are realistic and commonly faced in business
settings. This case scenario consists of a description of a workday in the life of “Bob,” a
fictional marketing research analyst. As Bob goes through his day, he reflects on the
issues and decisions he faces. Using this base context, the scenario content was modified
to mirror situations in which MBA students are typically taught to problem solve, i.e.,
they are presented with a business case scenario, which usually contains a wealth of
information, much of it irrelevant. The student's task is to determine which issues and
facts in the case are important and which are unimportant. The revised scenario was
written in the passive voice. Although Bob's thoughts and actions, and preferences and
concerns about particular situations were described, he did not exhibit intense displays of
primary emotions (happiness, sadness, fear, surprise, anger, disgust).
We specifically adapted this revised case scenario by modifying and expanding it to
reflect five types of discrete issues or events: strategic, tactical, justice, care, and neutral.
The justice issues inherent in the Sparks and Hunt scenario were modified and the care,
strategic and tactical issues, and neutral events, were created within the business
situational context. The sequence of issues and events was developed as evolving “story
segments” that comprised the overall case scenario or story. We developed a total of 41
story segments, 12 contained moral issues (describing six justice and six care issues), 12
contained nonmoral issues (describing six strategic and six tactical issues), and 17
contained neutral events (see Appendix A for examples). A greater number of neutral
events was developed to allow their interspersion with the other story segment types, and
to generate sufficient numbers of responses to neutral events to support their use in an
event-related image analysis. Each story segment was 2–3 sentences (and 23–35 words)

in length and was written at approximately the ninth grade level of reading
comprehension, according to the Flesch–Kincaid scale that assesses readability based on
the average number of syllables per word and the average number of words per sentence.
The 41 story segments were presented visually one at a time for 15 s each without
interruptions between them. Story segments were presented in a block design in which
two segments of a given type were separated by a neutral story segment, e.g., two care
issues, followed by a neutral story segment, followed by two strategic issues, etc. (Fig. 1).

Full-size image (34K)

Fig. 1. A schematic illustration of the fMRI study design for the moral sensitivity task.
An example of a sequential presentation of the different types of story segments
processed for the identification of “important” issues or events is shown. The fMRI
response and its statistical analysis focused on a “floating window” related to the
subject's response.

Story segment content conformed to the following definitions:
• Justice concerns fairness and impartiality. A just or fair person aims to treat another
person as an end rather than simply as a means to an end. Justice means liberating others
from injustice.
• Care concerns benevolence and compassion. A caring person treats another person with
sensitive discernment of, and response to, his or her contextually embedded need. Care
means liberating others from their state of need and actively promoting their welfare.
• Strategic decisions in organizations are typically concerned with the overall well-being
of the organization and involve long-range planning. Strategic decisions may require the
use of substantial resources, be characterized by uncertainty, and involve multiple
participants in the decision process.
• Tactical decisions tend to be concerned with one part of the organization and with
immediate and routine day-to-day operations. Tactical decisions require few resources,
are well structured, and are not expected to have long-term effects.
• Neutral story segments described an event related to Bob or more general information
(e.g., the location of a vendor's office) that did not pose a justice or care moral issue or a
strategic or tactical problem.

The story segments were examined for descriptions of social interactions for the
protagonist, Bob. Social interaction refers to Bob directly interacting or communicating
with others, e.g., “Bob telephoned a friend.” The incidence of social interaction was
similar in the justice (5 of 6), care (4 of 6), and strategic (3 of 6) story segments; the
tactical story segments, by design, did not include social interaction.
The developed story segments were subjected to content validation by expert raters. A
prototype set of 12 story segments (3 of each of the 4 types of moral and nonmoral
issues) was initially developed collaboratively by the authors, drawing upon their
collective expertise related to ethical reasoning and business decision making. The moral
and nonmoral issues were then evaluated through the use of 10 graduate students who
had completed advanced course work in the psychology of moral reasoning and who
received brief supplemental training on strategic and tactical reasoning. The student
experts independently rated each of the 12 dilemmas as primarily representing justice,
care, strategic or tactical issues. The experts showed a moderate level of agreement at this
stage of story segment development. When their rating differed from the intended
category, each rater was unblinded as to the construct the story segment was intended to
address and they were asked to write a brief explanation of why they had rated the story
segment as they did and how the story segment might be improved to better reflect the
intended issue type. This feedback was used to revise the story segments. The final set of
prototype issues used in this study was again rated independently by 10 additional
graduate student expert raters. The experts showed a high level of agreement in their
ratings. All raters completely agreed on 112 of the 120 ratings and the eight errors (6.6%)
were evenly distributed across the four story segment types. Overall, average agreement
among the 10 raters was 93.3%, which supported the content validity of the story
segments used in this study.
During fMRI acquisitions, story segments were presented through rear projection to a
screen placed at the end of the magnet bore and viewed by the subject via mirrors
mounted on the head coil. Subjects were told that they would read a story about a
workday in the life of Bob. They were instructed to read the content of the story segments
and respond using an MRI compatible button box to indicate with a right hand button
press when they were able to “identify an important point or issue” in the story. These
instructions were intentionally general, so as not to bias the subjects toward identifying
one particular type of issue included in the story. Subjects were instructed to respond as
often as they wished for each story segment, or not at all if no issue seemed important.
Later in the task protocol, three story segments within each category were sequentially
represented, and subjects were asked to rate their level of importance on a four-point
scale; a rating of one indicated an issue that was “not important,” and a score of four
indicated an issue that was “very important.” Before imaging, subjects were familiarized
with the stimuli and task and response requirements of the study by identifying
“important” items in a practice story segment involving the purchase of an automobile by
a separate fictional character, Joel.
2.3. Behavioral data analysis

The total number and mean number of important issues detected for each story segment
were calculated for the group, and pairwise comparisons across story segment categories
were made using the Wilcoxon Signed ranks test. Mean importance ratings were also
averaged for the story segment categories. Behavioral measures were compared between
the neutral story segment and the moral and nonmoral story segment categories, and
between the moral and nonmoral issue categories, with significant differences defined at
a p < 0.05 level.
2.4. fMRI acquisition and processing
All studies were conducted on a Siemens 3T whole body MRI scanner sited in Emory
Hospital. Brain imaging involved the acquisition of 25 axial slices of 4 mm thickness,
acquired parallel to the AC-PC line with a matrix size of 64 × 64 over a field of view of
22 cm × 22 cm. Blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) contrast images were
acquired (TE of 30 ms) using T2*-weighted gradient echo, echo-planar pulse sequences
with a TR of 4 s for a total of 154 scans. In addition, a 3-D MP-RAGE sequence was
collected at an isotropic resolution of 1 mm × 1 mm × 1 mm for 3-D anatomic analysis
and visualization of task-related activations. Head movement was limited by padding and
restraint. After discarding the first five scans to allow longitudinal relaxation to equalize,
images were resliced and corrected for motion by registration to the first functional image
acquired for each subject using a six parameter transformation. Images were then
spatially normalized to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template by applying a
12 parameter affine transformation followed by nonlinear warping using basic functions.
Images were smoothed using a Gaussian kernel of 8 mm full width at half maximum to
enhance signal to noise ratios and facilitate the within group analysis. Differences in
global BOLD signal were controlled by proportional scaling. Low frequency noise was
removed using a high-pass filter, and an autoregressive model was used to account for
serial correlations in the data.
2.5. fMRI data analysis
The data were analyzed in a two-stage, random effects procedure. In the first stage, the
BOLD response for each story segment category for each subject was modeled with the
standard canonical hemodynamic response function (cHRF). Parameter estimates of the
cHRF were created via within subject contrasts collapsed across conditions. The resulting
summary statistic images were then entered into a second stage analysis that treated each
subject as a random variable. In this way, both within and between subject variance is
accounted for in the model. Image analysis was conducted using MATLAB and
Statistical Parametric Mapping software (SPM2; Wellcome Department of Cognitive
Neurology, http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). A “window” of time bracketing a subject's
recognition of an important issue that included 2 s prior to and 1 TR after the subject's
button response (a total of 6 s) was used for the statistical analysis (Fig. 1). In this way,
the analysis is not a conventional event related design, but rather models the neural
response related to moral sensitivity as a temporally extended “event” involving both
issue awareness and interpretive evaluation (Rest, 1984). Thus, the process of moral
sensitivity is implicitly captured by the explicit task of identifying “important” issues by

button presses; as few as 27 and as many as 86 button responses were made for the
neutral and justice issue categories, respectively. Isolating the neural response to moral
issues involved contrasting the response to moral issues to that of multiple control
conditions. In planned comparisons to the moral (care and justice) issues, neutral story
segments were used to correct for neural activations related to attention, reading and
comprehension, context processing and sensorimotor aspects of task performance.
Nonmoral (strategic and tactical) issues were used as additional control conditions to
correct for activations related to temporally extended decisions involving multiple
response options and that impact others. Responses to neutral story segments were
included in the data analysis as 14 of 16 individuals identified an important issue within
at least one neutral story segment. For the remaining two individuals, an event window
within one neutral story segment was selected at random in order to retain all subjects in
the data analysis. Unless otherwise indicated, all activations were assessed at a
significance level of p < 0.001 (uncorrected) and an extent threshold of k > 5 voxels. In
addition, functional volumes-of-interest (VOI) were defined based on activations from
the moral-nonmoral issue contrast and included all significant voxels (p < 0.001,
uncorrected) within an eight mm radius of the peak voxel at an activation location. Time
courses for these VOI were plotted using finite impulse response functions (Burock &
Dale, 2000; Ollinger, Shulman, & Corbetta, 2001) as implemented in SPM within the
ROI toolbox created by Poldrack (SPM ROI Toolbox, http://spmtoolbox.sourceforge.net).

3. Results
3.1. Behavior
Table 1 displays the total number and the average number of issues per story segment
perceived as “important” for each story segment category. A significantly greater number
of issues was detected as important for all issue categories (i.e., justice, care, strategic,
tactical) compared to neutral events. More justice that care issues were identified, a
finding consistent with the notion that men, and perhaps business professionals, have a
greater affinity for an ethic of justice. The mean level of importance ratings are also
displayed in Table 1. Statistically significant differences in mean level of importance
ratings were obtained for all issue categories compared to neutral events, and for strategic
versus tactical issues. Overall, these behavioral data support the intended greater salience
of the care, justice, strategic and tactical story segments relative to the neutral story
segments.
Table 1.
Behavioral ratings for the number of identified “important” issues and the level of their
perceived importance for the study story segment
Task

Story segment category

Care

Justice

Strategic

Tactical

Neutral

Total numbera

54 ± 3.3b

86 ± 5.1

85 ± 4.9

66 ± 3.9

27 ± 1.6c

Mean number per story
segmentd

0.59 ± 0.27 0.89 ± 0.19 0.85 ± 0.2 0.67 ± 0.18 0.12 ± .08c

Rangee

0.17–1.00

0.67–1.33

0.50–1.33 0.33–1.00

Mean level of
importancee,f

2.7 ± 0.6

3.0 ± 0.7

3.4 ± 0.7

2.8 ± 0.6g

0–0.23
1.4 ± 0.7c

a

Data represent the mean ± 1 S.D. number of identified issues of importance across
subjects for the 13 neutral story segments and for six in each of the other categories.
b
p < 0.005 compared to justice story segments.
c
p < 0.005 for pairwise comparisons for identified issues in neutral story segments vs. the
other story segment categories.
d
Data represent the mean number of issues identified as important per story segment,
within each category.
e
As indicated by the range data, subjects sometimes identified multiple issues within one
story segment as important or failed to recognize such an issue in a story segment. Data
represent the mean ratings on a four point scale, with 1 = not important and 4 = very
important for three selected story segments in each category.
f
Data based on ratings for 15 of the 16 subjects.
g
p < 0.005 compared to strategic story segments.

3.2. fMRI
To identify the neural correlates of moral sensitivity, an implicit processing task
involving the BOLD fMRI response immediately preceding and following the
recognition of an “important” issue was considered in the data analyses. In the initial
analysis of moral sensitivity, we compared the neural response to the combined story
segments involving justice and care moral issues to the response to combined story
segments involving strategic and tactical problems. This contrast indicated the
differential activation of the medial prefrontal cortex, bilateral posterior superior
temporal sulcus (STS), dorsal posterior cingulate cortex, and medial orbitofrontal cortex
for sensitivity to moral issues (Table 2). The medial frontal cortical activation for this
contrast spanned polar (BA 9) and ventral (BA 10) prefrontal sites, and the orbitofrontal
cortex. The combined response to the justice and care story segments was also compared
to the response to the neutral story segments. This contrast was associated with relative
activation of the dorsal posterior cingulate cortex, insula, polar medial (BA 9) prefrontal
cortex, and bilateral posterior STS for the combined moral issues (Table 2, Fig. 2).
Relative to the neutral story segments, the implicit recognition of moral issues was
associated with decreased activation in distributed lateral frontal cortical sites, and the
right STS (Table 2).

Table 2.
Anatomical and stereotaxic locations of neural activations related to the implicit
recognition of moral and nonmoral issues
Brain region (Brodmann area)

Voxel T

Coordinates

x

y

z

−49 30

Increases
Care/justice (moral) > neutral (nonmoral)a
Posterior cingulate gyrus (31)

7.43

6

Insula

6.26

−30 −20 19

Medial frontal cortex (9)

5.75

2

Posterior STS (L22)

4.75

−59 −50 14

Posterior STS (R22)

4.21

65

−52 14

48

29

Care/justice (moral) > strategic/tactical (nonmoral)a
Medial frontal cortex
Polar (9)

7.69

4

62

32

Ventral (10)

6.27

2

59

6

Posterior STS (R22)

7.2

65

−52 17

Posterior STS (L22)

7.05

−59 −50 17

Precuneus (7)

6.71

8

−50 45

Orbital frontal cortex (11)

4.14

2

58

−11

Decreases
Neutral (nonmoral) > care/justice (moral)a
STS (R22)

7.28

65

−30 16

Inferior frontal gyrus (R45)

5.68

48

35

2

Brain region (Brodmann area)

Voxel T

Coordinates

x

y

z

17

27

Middle frontal gyrus (R9)

5.55

48

Middle frontal gyrus (L10)

5.18

−46 53

3

Middle frontal gyrus (R10)

4.67

44

54

−6

Ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (11) 4.36

24

48

−16

a

p < 0.001, uncorrected. Stereotaxic locations are defined in Talairach coordinate space
(Talairach and Tournoux, 1988) in millimeters relative to the midsagittal plane (x),
anterior/posterior to the anterior commissure (y), and superior/inferior to the anterior
commissure–posterior commissure (AC–PC) plane (z).

Full-size image (125K)

Fig. 2. Location of significant (p < 0.001, uncorrected) neural activations related to
sensitivity to moral (i.e., care and justice) vs. nonmoral (strategic and tactical) issues in
the study story segments. The left side of the figure depicts the results of the randomeffects group analysis and illustrates those brain regions that were differentially activated
by the moral vs. nonmoral story segments superimposed on the standard MNI brain. The
activation map and standard brain were imported from SPM2 into the Analysis of
Functional Neuroimaging (AFNI) software and subsequently rendered. The right side of
the figure depicts, for each story segment type, the time course of the hemodynamic
response for three brain activations of interest computed as the impulse response function
(IRF) for a 3D volume centered on the peak voxel. PCC = Posterior Cingulate Cortex,
Posterior STS = Posterior Superior Temporal Sulcus.

The time course of the peristimulus hemodynamic response function for each story
segment category for a VOI centered on the voxel maxima for the polar medial prefrontal
cortex, dorsal posterior cingulate cortex, and left posterior STS (Table 2) is illustrated in
Fig. 2. These plotted relationships indicate that polar medial prefrontal cortex activation
associated with sensitivity to moral issues was related to both increases in activity for the
recognition of moral issues and decreases in activity for the recognition of non-moral

(strategic and tactical) problems or neutral events (Fig. 2). Activations in the dorsal
posterior cingulate cortex (Table 2) were apparently similarly attributable to both
recognition-related increases for moral issues and decreases for non-moral problems or
neutral events. Observed left posterior STS activations were the result of greater
recognition-related increases for moral issues.
Justice and care moral issues were also considered separately. A direct comparison of
justice and care moral issues indicated that sensitivity to care moral issues was associated
with greater activation (p < 0.001, uncorrected) in the ventral posterior cingulate cortex,
medial orbitofrontal cortex, right middle and inferior frontal gyri, left posterior STS, and
thalamus (Table 3; Fig. 3). Relative to care issues, sensitivity to justice moral issues was
associated with greater activation of the left intraparietal sulcus (IPS) extending into the
dorsal bank of the posterior STS, albeit at a less stringent statistical threshold. Compared
to issue recognition in neutral story segments, sensitivity to care moral issues was
associated with activation of the dorsal posterior cingulate cortex, polar and ventral
medial prefrontal cortex, bilateral posterior STS, and insula (Table 3). Sensitivity to
justice moral issues, relative to neutral events, similarly activated the dorsal posterior
cingulate cortex, insula, polar medial prefrontal cortex, and left posterior STS (Table 3;
Fig. 3).
Table 3.
Anatomical and stereotaxic locations of differential neural activations related to the
implicit recognition of care and justice moral dilemmas
Brain region (Brodmann area) Voxel T

Coordinates

x

y

z

6.55

8

-51

30

Polar (9)

6.77

4

56

32

Ventral (10)

4.84

4

58

3

Posterior STS (L 22)

5.44

−61 −52 15

Insula

4.92

−30 −22 20

Posterior STS (R22)

4.84

65

Care > neutrala
Posterior cingulate gyrus (31)
Medial frontal cortex

−52 14

Brain region (Brodmann area) Voxel T

Coordinates

x

y

z

Care > justicea
Retrosplenial cortex (31)

7.62

−6

−61 16

Orbital frontal cortex (11)

5.27

2

46

−16

Middle frontal gyrus (R8)

4.88

36

33

48

Posterior STS (L22)

4.74

−67 −33 9

Inferior frontal gyrus (R46)

4.26

50

32

Thalamus

4.03

8

−11 13

Posterior cingulate gyrus (31)

6.91

6

−49 30

Insula (L)

5.47

−30 −22 21

Medial frontal gyrus (9)

5.09

2

Posterior STS (L 22)

4.05

−57 −42 9

6.43

−59 −40 22

11

Justice > neutrala

48

29

Justice > careb
Posterior STS (left 22)

Stereotaxic locations are defined in Talairach coordinate space (Talairach and Tournoux,
1988) in millimeters relative to the midsagittal plane (x), anterior/posterior to the anterior
commissure (y), and superior/inferior to the anterior commissure–posterior commissure
(AC–PC) plane (z).
a
b

p < 0.001, uncorrected.
p < 0.005, uncorrected.

Full-size image (122K)

Fig. 3. Location of significant (p < 0.001, uncorrected) neural activations related to
sensitivity to care vs. justice moral issues in the study story segments. The results from
the SPM2 analyses are shown superimposed on axial images of the MNI brain standard.

4. Discussion
Theoretical accounts of moral decision making distinguish between the component
processes of moral sensitivity or intuition, judgment, motivation, and character related to
moral behavior (Rest, 1984 and Haidt, 2001). The primary goal of the present in vivo
functional neuroimaging study was to localize those neural activations that are related to
moral sensitivity, a component process proposed to involve both the detection and
interpretation of a moral issue or situation. Moral behavior and its cognitive and neural
processing correlates are strongly dependent on stimulus variables such as situational
context and familiarity, and subject variables such as beliefs, cultural affiliations, sex and
occupation (Casebeer, 2003 and Gilligan, 1982; Moll, Zahn et al., 2005). In addressing
these demands of ecological validity, this study design focused on the implicit
recognition of real life ethical challenges encountered by male business professionals in a
typical business setting. The value of this study lies, however, not in its ability to inform
the neural representations of moral sensitivity in business professionals, but rather to
inform this process using ecologically relevant tasks to render the results meaningful to
everyday behavior for other subject samples in familiar contexts. We speculate that
similar results would be obtained related to the neural processing of moral issues in
nurses confronting such issues in a hospital care setting or police functioning in a law
enforcement setting. Such comparisons would perhaps represent an informative
assessment of the influence of different affinities for care versus justice moralities on the
neural representation of the sensitivity or interpretive awareness of care and justice moral
issues. This contention, however, needs to be evaluated.
4.1. Moral sensitivity as a special case of self-referential thinking?
The results of this study implicated three brain areas as critical to moral sensitivity: the
medial prefrontal cortex, the posterior cingulate cortex, and the posterior STS. Despite
remarkable variability in stimuli and tasks between studies, these findings are strikingly
consistent with the results of prior fMRI studies of implicit and explicit moral judgments
(Greene et al., 2001; Heekeren, Wartenburger, Schmidt, Schwintowski, & Villringer,

2003; Moll et al., 2002a and Moll et al., 2002b; Moll, Zahn et al., 2005) that revealed
primary neural activations in mesial cortical regions and the posterior STS.
4.1.1. Medial prefrontal cortex

In the current study, greater activation of the polar medial prefrontal cortex was
associated with sensitivity to moral issues versus either neutral events or nonmoral issues.
The medial prefrontal cortex has been implicated in diverse brain functions including
imitation (Chaminade, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2002), processing rewarded behavioral
outcomes (Knutson, Fong, Bennett, Adams, & Hommer, 2003), emotion response
monitoring (Lane, Reiman, Ahern, Schwartz, & Davidson, 1997), error detection
(Garavan, Ross, Murphy, Roche, & Stein, 2002), evaluative judgments (Zysset, Huber,
Ferstl, & Yves von Cramon, 2002), pain perception, and the temporal sequencing of
behavior (Dreher, Koechlin, Ali, & Grafman, 2002). All of these functions are arguably
linked to self-monitoring behavior. Recent fMRI studies of neural activations related to
the concept of “self” have demonstrated activation of the anterior medial prefrontal
cortex during self-referential processing (Fossati et al., 2003, Johnson et al., 2002, Kelley
et al., 2002 and Phan et al., 2004). Similar to self referential processing (Kelley et al.,
2002) and the proposed role of the medial prefrontal cortex in spontaneous self referential
mental activity as a default mode of brain function (Gusnard, Akbudak, Shulman, &
Raichle, 2001), the implicit recognition of moral issues was associated with medial
prefrontal cortex “activations” that were, in significant part, the result of deactivations of
this area by the contrasted control conditions (i.e., strategic and tactical or neutral story
segments). Also, polar medial prefrontal cortex activation associated with moral
judgments was observed for the comparison of personal versus impersonal moral
issues—essentially a self-reference task (Greene et al., 2001). Thus, a plausible
functional inference is that access to knowledge of self is critical to moral sensitivity.
This interpretation is consistent with a proposed role of temporally extended
representations of event sequence knowledge in moral cognitions (Moll, Zahn et al.,
2005), but emphasizes the specific involvement of self semantic knowledge perhaps akin
to the temporally extended, relatively context-independent “narrative” self (Gallagher et
al., 2000). Such an overarching role for the polar medial prefrontal cortex in moral
cognition explains its common activation across diverse moral cognition tasks.
The medial prefrontal cortex has, however, also been associated with performance on
“theory of mind” tasks, which require an ability to imagine or predict another's
perspective, intentions, or actions (Castelli, Happe, Frith, & Frith, 2000; Vogeley et al.,
2004; but see Bird, Castelli, Malik, Frith, & Husain, 2004). Although participants in the
current study were not instructed to consider the mental states of others in the story
segments, the observed medial prefrontal cortex activation may reflect an implicit theory
of mind process. Thus, a seemingly competing interpretation is that medial prefrontal
cortex activations related to moral sensitivity represent the involvement of third-person,
rather than first-person, perspective taking. While recent fMRI studies have sought to
dissociate the neural correlates of first- and third-person perspectives, their attribution of
observed medial prefrontal cortex activations to either the first- or third-person
perspective are remarkably discordant (Ruby & Decety, 2003; Vogeley et al., 2004). This
discrepancy may reflect differences between studies in the object of perspective (e.g.,

inanimate objects, their mothers), or the belief that self perspective is an integral process
in assessing the perspective of others (e.g., Gilovich, Medvec, & Savitsky, 2000).
Consistent with this belief, recent reviews (Frith, 2001; Wicker, Ruby, Royet, & Fonlupt,
2003) concluded that medial prefrontal cortex activations observed when mental states
are attributed to others overlap those associated with the monitoring of one's own mental
state. We therefore propose that the medial prefrontal cortex activation observed in this
study is consistent with moral sensitivity as a perspective-taking process involving access
to both self and social semantic knowledge. This interpretation is consistent with
theoretical models of moral thinking that propose that moral decisions and actions are
related to self-identity and self-interests (Bersoff, 1999; Haviv & Leman, 2002) and that
moral thinking is dependent on understanding others’ perspectives (Rest, 1984).
4.1.2. Dorsal posterior cingulate cortex

Sensitivity to moral issues was associated with activation of posterior cingulate cortex
located on the dorsal bank of the cingulate gyrus. This activation was observed in prior
studies of moral reasoning and was specifically associated with evaluating the
appropriateness of solutions to personal moral dilemmas (Greene et al., 2001). The
posterior cingulate cortex has been implicated in seemingly diverse functions including
the experience of emotion (Mayberg et al., 1999), recall of emotional memories (Maratos,
Dolan, Morris, Henson, & Rugg, 2001; Maddock, Garrett, & Buonocore, 2003), reward
processing (Knutson et al., 2003), forgivability (Farrow et al., 2001), and self-reference
(Fossati et al., 2003, Johnson et al., 2002 and Kelley et al., 2002; Ruby and Decety,
2003). The posterior cingulate cortex is also activated by the successful recall of
autobiographical memories (Maddock, Garrett, & Buonocore, 2001; Piefke, Weiss,
Zilles, Markowitsch, & Fink, 2003). Anderson et al. (1999) have argued that moral
judgments are related to access to memories of outcomes of past moral decisions. Thus,
the observed posterior cingulate cortex activation may reflect the dependence of moral
sensitivity on access to one's emotional, cognitive and somatic experiences related to
previous moral conflicts. In particular, the posterior cingulate cortex may mediate the
process by which knowledge of past experiences is used to guide an interpretive
awareness of moral situations. Furthermore, the posterior cingulate cortex may contribute
to moral evaluations made by taking a first-person perspective (Ruby & Decety, 2003)
and predicting one's own responses, emotional or otherwise, to a specific moral action.
This interpretation is consistent with the posterior cingulate cortex as an interface
between emotion and cognition (Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000; Vogt, Finch, & Olson,
1992) and with the social intuitionist model proposed by Haidt (2001) and Greene and
Haidt (2002).
4.1.3. Posterior STS

Brain regions bordering the STS, particularly its posterior extent, have been implicated in
perceptions related to social cognition (Adolphs, 2003). Cortex within and adjacent to the
STS is activated by social signals involving expressive movements of the face, hands,
mouth and eyes, and referred to as “biological motion” (Allison, Puce, & McCarthy,
2000; Grèzes et al., 2001; Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000; Kilts, Egan, Gideon, Ely,
& Hoffman, 2003). The posterior STS is also activated during effort related to assessing

the intentions of other individuals or violations of expectation, often modeled in theory of
mind paradigms (Castelli et al., 2000 and Gallagher et al., 2000; Grèzes, Frith, &
Passingham, 2004). Its demonstrated roles in social perception and maintaining social
behavioral representations are consistent with a role of the posterior STS in social
perspective taking in the service of moral sensitivity. This interpretation is consistent
with the view of moral decision making as a social process attentive to the actions of
external audiences (Carpendale & Krebs, 1995). Even in Kohlberg's (1984) theory of
moral judgment, the ability to perceive the perspectives of others and social role taking
were deemed essential to moral decision making, particularly for individuals at higher
stages of moral reasoning ability. Posterior STS activation is consistent across tasks that
require perceptual, cognitive, and emotional perspective taking (Frith, 2001; Ruby &
Decety, 2001). The role of the posterior STS in multimodal sensory integration (Karnath,
2001; Taylor, Moss, Stamatakis, & Tyler, 2006) suggests that its further role may be to
integrate perspectives taken from these different vantage points.
Two brain areas implicated in prior functional neuroimaging studies of moral cognitions
– the amygdala (Moll et al., 2002; Greene et al., 2001) and anterior temporal cortex
(Moll, Zahn et al., 2005) – were not activated by this moral sensitivity task. Similar to the
results of an fMRI study of moral judgments for non-emotional stimuli (Moll, OliveiraSouza et al. 2002), amygdala activation was not observed in the present study of moral
and non-moral story segments that were devoid of overt emotion content. Absent
amygdala and anterior temporal cortex activations may reflect the omission of overt
emotional responses in the story segments and the resulting lack of processing demands
for evaluating emotional salience and motivation, or for access to the representations of
social emotions (Moll et al., 2005).
4.2. Common and distinct neural representations of sensitivity to moral issues of
justice and care
Moral sensitivity to either care or justice issues was associated with activation of the
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, posterior STS and posterior cingulate cortex. However, the
results of this study also support a distinction between neural information processing
related to sensitivity to justice and care moral issues. The ethics of justice relies on
processing issues based on rules, and social codes and mores. In contrast, the ethics of
care emphasizes feeling rather than thinking in processing moral issues, presumably
drawing on social and primary emotions in evaluating moral conflicts. The direct
comparison of responses to care and justice moral issues revealed activation of the medial
orbitofrontal cortex, a paralimbic sensory association area implicated in social and
emotional behavior (Adolphs, 2003, Anderson et al., 1999 and Brothers, 1990) and in the
processing of social emotions (Decety & Chaminade, 2003; Moll et al., 2002; Moll et al.,
2002b and Moll et al., 2005b) for sensitivity to care moral issues. The role of social
emotions in sensitivity to care issues is supported by the additional engagement of the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex, relative to the neutral condition, an area involved in social
and emotional semantic representations (Moll, Zahn et al., 2005) and in emotional
empathy (Saxe, 2006). The medial orbitofrontal cortex has also been implicated in thirdperson perspective taking (Ruby & Decety, 2004). With the thalamus, the medial

orbitofrontal and ventromedial prefrontal cortex may comprise a neural pathway by
which affective, somatosensory, and autonomic representations are used to detect and
evaluate care issues. Sensitivity to moral issues of care was also associated with
differential activation of the ventral posterior cingulate cortex, suggesting that its role in
the integration of emotion and memory-related processes (Maddock et al., 2003) is
distinctly involved in the interpretive awareness of care versus justice moral issues.
Sensitivity to moral issues of care may thus involve emotion processing at both the firstperson and third-person perspective, and the recall of social-emotional representations of
past moral conflicts. This interpretation is consistent with the conceptualization of the
“ethics of care” proposed by Gilligan (1977) and reinforced by Noddings (1984), that
emphasizes considerations of emotional response and a balance of self-perspective versus
other perspectives.
The direct comparison of sensitivity to justice relative to care moral issues revealed a
preferential activation for justice issues in only the left IPS, and only at a less stringent
statistical threshold. Left IPS activations have been associated with the processing of
categorical representations (Saneyoshi, Kaminaga, & Michimata, 2006), of behavioral
actions and their intentions (Fogassi et al., 2005), and the processes of imitation
(Iacoboni, 2005) and heteromodal association for crossmodal binding of features to form
coherent object or situational representations (Taylor et al., 2006). Thus, greater left IPS
activation observed in the current study for justice versus care issues may reflect
integrating situational features and simulating their representation for reference to
categorical properties of laws, mores and rules. These implied functional attributes of a
differential left IPS activation associated with an interpretive awareness of justice moral
issues are consistent with the application of a standard set of rules to the evaluation of
justice moral issues (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987), though this inference is highly
speculative based on the limited available evidence.
4.3. Limitations of the study
Several limitations of this study of moral sensitivity exist and provide direction for future
studies of moral behavior. First, this study included only male subjects. The selection of a
single sex was motivated by a prominent, though controversial, contention that sex
differences exist in moral orientation (Gilligan, 1982). A clear need exists to replicate this
study with female subjects, particularly a study of possible sex effects on the neural
correlates of care and justice moral judgments. Second, this study focused on the implicit
recognition of moral versus non-moral issues as a measure of moral sensitivity. The
dissociation of neural information processing related to implicit versus explicit tasks has
been the subject of recent functional neuroimaging studies (e.g., Critchley et al., 2000)
and would be of interest here in assessing whether the putative topology of moral
behavior (Narvaez & Rest, 1995; Rest, 1994) includes dissociable neural correlates for
moral sensitivity versus post-hoc reasoning. Third, the definition of a functional
neuroanatomy of moral sensitivity would benefit from the consideration of individual
variation in ability. Structured instruments and interviews (i.e., Moral Judgment
Interview and the Ethics of Care Interview) were used to assess this variance, but yielded
an insufficient dynamic range of scores to permit their use in regression models analyzing

the fMRI data. Although the functional inferences from this study provide testable
hypotheses for such future research, much remains to be done in elaborating a more
definitive model of the neural basis of moral cognition. Fourth, the study focused on
business professionals enrolled in an executive MBA degree program and thus the results
could be considered to be informative of this sample only. However, research has shown
that the moral reasoning of business graduate students and business professionals is
comparable to that of college students and adults in general (Rest, 1994) and more
representative of the general population than that of other professional groups (e.g., law,
medicine).
In summary, the results of this study are consistent with the involvement of a network of
brain regions in moral sensitivity which perhaps subserve complementary roles related to
first-person perspective taking, access to autobiographical memories and knowledge
related to self and social cognition and third-person attributions of mental states. We
found a distinction between the neural representation of care and justice moral sensitivity
that emphasizes differences in the roles of social and emotional information in their
interpretive awareness. Our results provide support at the level of neural processing
models for the contentions of the theorists Rest and Kohlberg that self- and otherperspective taking is an important component of moral thought, as well as support for
Gilligan's distinction between justice and care issues and her emphasis on the importance
of emotion in the “ethics of care.” Future research may focus on corollaries of these
findings—that immoral actions may reflect an exaggerated or dysfunctional selfrepresentation, inaccessibility of internal models of behavior formed by past experiences,
a faulty perspective of the outcome of actions on others, or their combination. Our
findings also have implications for the development of moral sensitivity, suggesting that
efforts to sensitize individuals to moral issues focus on methods that tap into
introspection based on personal experiences, as well as the use of perspective taking
techniques such as role playing.
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Appendix A.
A.1. Instructions
You will read the story one paragraph at a time. You will have fifteen seconds to read
each paragraph. Please take your time and read each paragraph carefully. If you believe
that an important issue is raised in the paragraph, push button number (1) on the keypad
with your index finger.
It was a late morning in mid-December. Bob Smith, a research analyst, was in his office
at the L & H Marketing Research Company, a firm located in a metropolitan center on
the East Coast. N1
Bob was working furiously to complete the marketing strategy report for his client,
Standard Grooming Products. The client was in the process of introducing a new men's
hair spray product. N

Standard Grooming needed data on the buying practices and media habits of men who
use hair spray. Print, TV and radio media outlets were of particular interest. N
Bob began to review his current situation and his on-going history with the project. N
Two years ago, Bob had joined L & H, a marketing research company specializing in
consumer products. Before that he had worked for another marketing research firm. N
A long series of problems had slowed the marketing research report that was due on
Monday. Bob regretted having to leave his wife and children to come into the office
today, a Saturday, to complete the report. C
He really did not like spending weekends away from his family. Most of all, he did not
like disappointing his 12 year-old daughter by missing her Saturday morning basketball
game. C
Bob's thoughts returned to the marketing strategy report and the client's files sitting on his
mahogany desk. N
Bob's boss, Barry Michaels, had originally recommended that they focus on TV
advertising. Barry had made it clear that he only wanted to see data that supported his
thinking. Bob now knew that the survey results painted a different picture. J
Bob felt pressured by Barry, his boss, to “bend” the interpretation of the data. Bob,
however, was reluctant to make the survey results appear more consistent with Barry's
biases. J
A telephone call from the weekend guard served as a reminder to Bob that he had ordered
a take-out lunch from the local deli. Bob told the guard to allow the delivery person
access to L & H Marketing's suite of offices. N
Bob continued to review the history of the project. He recalled that back in September he
had followed L & H Marketing's template for standard sampling procedures for projects
of this type. T
On this basis, he had considered surveying 250 users of men's hair spray from each of 15
different cities. This would have resulted in a total sample of 3750 men. T
The building was almost empty. Bob found that a quiet environment facilitated his ability
to think through the history of the project. N
Bob recalled disagreeing with Charles Chastain, from Standard Grooming's marketing
department. Charles had argued for samples proportional to city sizes. This, however,
would mean committing more money and resources over the life of the project. S

In the end, they disagreed. Charles stressed the importance of collecting more
representative data that would increase the study's validity. Bob, however, was concerned
about the increase in cost that would interfere with doing other studies of equal
importance. S
While Bob was going over these issues in his mind, his lunch arrived: a beverage and
sandwich in a plain cardboard container. After finishing his lunch, Bob returned to
thinking about his marketing report. N
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